Jenin Fury Carving New Rules of Engagement, Deterrence in West Bank

On June 20, Palestinian Resistance fighters led by the Al-Quds Brigades – Jenin Battalion executed thoroughly planned ambushes on Israeli forces who were raiding the camp, thwarting their mission and dealing several casualties on the intruding troops.  

The Israeli response marked the first use of Israeli air force capabilities in the West Bank since the second Intifada, as the army sent out Apache helicopters to secure the escape of besieged forces in the camp who came under the heavy fire of fighters.  

Monday’s military campaign on Jenin and the Jenin refugee camp comes as the Israeli occupation forces attempt to reconstruct its deterrence capabilities in the occupied West Bank, which has experienced a substantial surge in the Resistance’s organization, popularity, and capabilities.  

The Battle of the Fury of Jenin will test the Resistance’s ability to shift the deterrence equation in their favor against the floundering Israeli ground troops and command as a journey similar to that of the freed Gaza Strip begins to materialize.

Attack drones lead the aggression

In what the Israelis dubbed “Operation Garden and Home” the Israeli forces have sent out hundreds of armored vehicles carrying ground troops as well as bulldozers in their invasion of Jenin. 

However, the occupation forces’ experience in June has necessitated that strike and surveillance drones be heavily deployed in its aggression on the northern West Bank city and its refugee camp. This shows that Israeli ground troops are no longer able, by themselves, to establish supremacy in Jenin which has been at the forefront of the phenomenon of Resistance in the West Bank.

At around 10:20 AM on Sunday night, local sources in Jenin reported heavy activity of Israeli drones over the city, as fear grew over the possibility of a large campaign grew. At 1:13 AM on Monday, the first explosion was reported in the city followed by a series of explosions signaling in armored vehicles which invaded Jenin a few minutes after. Since then, Resistance fighters have continued to confront intruding forces, executing multiple ambushes that targeted Israeli convoys across the camp. 

After reports showed that Netanyahu and Galant have greenlit a major campaign in the West Bank on Sunday night, locals reported on the presence of a large number of drones and quadcopters in Jenin and its vicinity, as the Israeli forces collected information and intel before launching their attack.

Resistance fighters from the Al-Quds Brigades, Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and the Al-Qassam Brigades announced on different instances they were able to directly target Israeli forces, as reports and photo evidence showed a Black Hawk helicopter transferring IOF casualties from the battlefield.

Hyper-dependency on Technology

A noticeable trend could be highlighted when examining the Israeli tactics as it seeks to secure its security goals in Palestine.

That is its hyper-dependency on technology after its attempts to put an end to the progression of the Resistance capabilities has led to successive failures, highlighted by the constant growth of the Resistance, whether as an idea that Palestinians relate to and support or simply on the military level.

“Israel” has been able to achieve a bulk of its security goals in the West Bank since the second Intifada due to a number of factors which include active collaboration with parties inside the West Bank through the so-called security coordination and ill-preparedness of Resistance groups.

The diligent work undertaken by Palestinian factions headed by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, who have created the necessary infrastructure and commands, capitalizing on the sentiments of Palestinian youth who seek to free themselves from the bitterness of a reality which they were born into, has led to the expansion of the Resistance’s capabilities and operations in the occupied territories. 

Parallels could be drawn between Israeli tactics in Gaza and those used in the West Bank today. 

This scenario was largely due to heavy losses suffered in the ranks of the elite Golani Brigade when Israeli occupation attempted a ground invasion on the Strip, a possibility which could repeat itself as the Resistance has only gained more expertise and technologies which would allow it to recreate such an event if necessary.

Since January 2009, the Israeli forces have not been successful in invading Gaza Strip with ground units after a campaign was launched by the government to end the “indiscriminate” rocket fire from the Strip towards occupied territories. Instead “Israel” has depended heavily on the use of air raids and precise drone strikes in its aggression on the Strip.

The Israeli military and political command are well aware of the situation, thus they have depended heavily on air raids and strikes in every battle with the Palestinian Resistance in Gaza since then.

Its bombing campaigns in Gaza have proven next to be useless in the long run, as the occupation has been unable to halt the progression of the Resistance’s military capabilities nor has it been able to severely damage its intricate and well-developed infrastructure, two failed objectives that were clearly highlighted in the aftermath of the May 2021 battle of Seif Al-Quds.

This phenomenon begs further examination into the structure of the Israeli forces, the morale of its troops, as well as the Zionist social fabric as a whole, which will be studied in upcoming reports.

The possibility of a multifront war prevents genocide

Back to the focus of this analysis, the military campaign on Jenin, “Israel” has been forced to act in accordance fo red lines which the Axis of Resistance over the past 20 years has cemented in their deterrence against the IOF.

In 2002, the IOF embarked on a large-scale attack on the Jenin refugee camp, as it massacred the residents of the city. The repetition of such a scenario in which the Israeli forces indiscriminately slaughter Palestinians in the West Bank will come at a high price for “Israel”. Wide condemnations and UN resolutions have historically failed to halt the massacring of the land’s indigenous people by an occupying force, as exemplified in 2002.

Today, such an endeavor would open up a Pandora’s Box for the Israeli command which does not want to and cannot deal with an event in which rockets bombard its positions from Syria, Gaza, and Lebanon, especially amid the ongoing escalation in the north and the boiling internal political and social situation within the colonial entity. 

A destructive bombing of the camp, which is being speculated as this piece is being written, means that the occupation has been unable to reach its security goals in this operation and has chosen to commit another atrocity marking another failure of its security and military strategies.

Its leadership is well aware of this situation, which is why “Israel” limits its operations to small-scale and quick attacks, as it seeks to isolate Resistance factions and limit their cooperation in the field.