Moscow refuses Israel’s proposals to resolve Jewish Agency crisis
The crisis between Israel and Russia over the operation of the Jewish Agency, which is tasked with assisting Jews who want to emigrate to Israel, is not going anywhere. In fact, it may be escalating.
No progress was made at an Aug. 1 meeting in Moscow between the legal delegation sent by Israel and Russian Justice Ministry officials. And what’s worse, the Russians seemed to leave no room for any negotiations or litigation. They presented Israel with a stark position: The Jewish Agency had broken Russian law and it must shut down its operations that facilitate the immigration of Russian Jews to Israel.
Israel continues to puzzle over the intentions of Russian President Vladimir Putin, but has been unable to come up with a clear answer, especially given his silence on the matter. As far as Israel is concerned, shuttering the Jewish Agency while some 150,000 Jews still live in Russia is almost tantamount to a declaration of war. In fact, diplomatic war would have been declared, at least metaphorically so, were it not for the fact that in this case the enemy is Russia.
Israel is equally puzzled over the thinking of another influential figure who holds significant sway in the Middle East: Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. This is particularly relevant in the context of the US-mediated Israeli-Lebanese negotiations on demarcating the borders of their economic waters. Here, too, Israel is scratching its head, trying to figure out Nasrallah’s game plan. In an interesting convergence, these two identical questions regarding Putin and Nasrallah could well be related.
The prevalent thinking among most Israeli diplomatic and intelligence officials perceives the crisis over the Jewish Agency’s continued operations as a signal by Putin, a type of limited cooling of relations, to protest Israel’s significant alignment with the West regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine under newly installed Prime Minister Yair Lapid.
“Putin wants the respect he deserves from Israel,” a senior Israeli diplomatic source told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity. “He is unwilling to overlook Israeli declarations that deviate from the semi-objective, or at least polite stand adopted in the days of [then-Prime Minister] Naftali Bennett.”
But this view is not unanimous. A minority position, described at this point as subversive, links the event to a crucial strategic issue: Israel’s offshore natural gas reserves.
It is no secret that Russia’s oil and gas reserves are practically Putin’s only significant remaining cards vis-a-vis the West (except for nonconventional weapons). These Russian cards could be devalued if new exporters join the fray, exporters such as Israel that has begun selling liquified gas to Europe through Egypt. Lebanon could also join this potential field of business rivals if agreement is reached with Israel on its maritime boundaries and it embarks on an intense exploration for gas off its shores, where experts believe prospects are high for an additional natural gas bonanza.
Those subscribing to this view point to the link between Nasrallah’s escalating threats, Hezbollah’s July 2 launch of three drones, which Israel shot down, toward the Israeli Karish gas drilling rig in the Mediterranean and the July 19 Tehran summit attended by Putin, Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi and Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
An additional element that might be at play is a proposed gas pipeline from Israel to Europe, through Cyprus and Greece, which although deemed by the United States economically nonviable is still under discussion.
Is Putin trying, indeed, to block Israeli and future Lebanese gas exports to Europe in order to protect his bargaining chips? “It is all about gas,” an Israeli diplomatic source familiar with the contacts with Lebanon over its economic waters told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity. “I have no doubt that Putin is thinking mostly about the gas issue.”
Optimistic reports emerged Aug. 1 in regard to this issue. After meeting with the Lebanese leadership in Beirut Aug. 1, US mediator Amos Hochstein was quoted as saying that he looks “forward to coming back to the region” and “being able to make the final arrangements.” Barak Ravid reported Aug. 2, “Prime Minister Yair Lapid met last night with the American mediator for the maritime negotiations with Lebanon Amos Hochstein.” Apparently, Hochstein arrived to Israel in further attempts to reduce gaps between the positions of Beirut and Jerusalem, with the hope of reaching soon an agreed-upon compromise.
According to Western intelligence sources, Nasrallah has dropped his threats against Israel and its gas drilling in the wake of an Israeli compromise proposal agreeing to shift the border of its economic waters in a way that would enable Lebanon to drill in the area under dispute. Israel appears to be interested in the deployment of a Lebanese rig in the same area, even seeing such a possibility as an “insurance policy” for its own activities.
However, it is too soon to uncork the champagne. Israel remains skeptical because it has yet to figure out Nasrallah’s intentions. Does he want a Lebanese-Israeli agreement that he can credit to Hezbollah’s threats and thereby buttress his standing not only as the defender of Lebanon but also as the shining knight of its gas bonanza? Or, does he want to rain on the parade, torpedo an agreement and intensify pressure on Israel in the service of Iran and perhaps Russia?
Both schools of thought have their adherents in Israel.
“This can only be examined in light of developments on the ground, and it will happen very soon,” another senior Israeli diplomatic source told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity. The source was referring to the launch of gas drilling by the Karish rig scheduled for next month. Nasrallah recently climbed the highest tree in the region when he threatened to scuttle the inauguration of the rig. On July 31, he posted a video clip of the rig as seen through a scope, signaling an inferred threat.
Will Israel blink and delay the start of pumping from Karish? How will it respond if an agreement with Lebanon is not reached and Nasrallah makes good on his threats and launches an unprecedented attack on an Israeli gas rig?
Will this pressure yield results? We will only find out in real time. According to a prevailing assessment, Lapid will not risk a war with Lebanon just weeks before the crucial Nov. 1 Israeli elections, but predictions have a way of crashing against the rocks of Middle Eastern reality — usually with a loud bang.
Israel would almost certainly retaliate militarily, but against which targets and at what level of intensity? The United States is urging Israel to limit its military response in such an eventuality in order to avoid regional escalation.