US intelligence: China’s Army owns “about half of the world’s ISR systems”

China and Russia continue to rapidly “mature” their counterspace capabilities, but they also have been modernizing their own space systems at a breathtaking pace since 2019 — in some part to reduce their reliance on US and other foreign providers, according to a new Defense Intelligence Agency analysis.

“It’s not just the capability, it’s the fact that … they each have a Space Force,” John Huth, DIA defense intelligence officer for space and counterspace, explained in a press briefing today. “And their intent is to make space part of that combined arms effort in any conflict.”

Senior DIA space analyst Kevin Ryder added: “China and Russia value superiority in space and as a result, they’ll seek ways to strengthen their space and counterspace programs and determine better ways to integrate them within their respective militaries,” added

The report says that between 2019 and 2021 “the combined operational space fleets of China and Russia” have grown by approximately 70%, following a 200% increase between 2015 and 2019 across “nearly all major space categories.”

“Since early 2019, competitor space operations have also increased in pace and scope worldwide, China’s and Russia’s counterspace developments continue to mature, global space services proliferate, and orbital congestion has increased,” the report says.

The bottom line, according to DIA is that space “is being increasingly militarized” around the globe, and the threats to US military and commercial space activities continue to grow.

“The expansion of Chinese and Russian space and counterspace weapons combined with the general rise of other foreign space capabilities is driving many nations to formalize their space policies to better position themselves to secure the space domain and facilitate their own space services,” the report says.

The report, “2022 Challenges to Security in Space,” is the second unclassified space threat assessment released by DIA, following the original version in 2019. Aimed at the general public, the report combines a review of past developments based on open source information, as well as what might be characterized as informed speculation about future threats.

The second edition continues to focus on China and Russia, but like it’s predecessor also looks briefly at counterspace activities by Iran and North Korea — as well as broader changes in the space environment, such as the proliferation of commercial capabilities and the upwards trend in space debris that could threaten US space assets.

“The second iteration addresses increases in the pace and scope of competitive space operations since early 2019, of which, you are about to hear, have been dramatic,” Huth said.

In particular, the report says, China and Russia are “developing various means to exploit the perceived U.S. reliance on space-based systems and challenge the U.S. position in the space domain. Beijing and Moscow seek to position themselves as leading space powers, intent on creating new global space norms,” the report says. “Through the use of space and counterspace capabilities, they aspire to undercut U.S. global leadership. Iran and North Korea will continue to develop and operate electronic warfare (EW) capabilities to deny or degrade space-based communications and navigation.”

China As An ISR Powerhouse; Details Of Orbital Weapons System Remain A Mystery

As of January 2022, China’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) satellite fleet “contained more than 250 systems—a quantity second only to the United States,” the report says. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) now owns/operates “about half of the world’s ISR systems, most of which could support monitoring, tracking, and targeting of U.S. and allied forces worldwide, especially throughout the Indo-Pacific region.” And Beijing continues to pursue improvements to these systems that “should increase China’s monitoring capabilities—including observation of U.S. aircraft carriers, expeditionary strike groups, and deployed air wings, making them more susceptible to long-range strikes. … These capabilities are being augmented with electronic reconnaissance satellites that monitor radar and radio transmissions.”

As for counterspace weapons, DIA notes that while the PLA’s “operational ground-based ASAT missile system is intended to target” satellites in Low Earth Orbit (where many intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance birds operate), it also “probably intends” to pursue those that can reach both Medium Earth Orbit (the location of GPS satellites) and Geosynchronous Orbit where both US commercial and military satellite communications are stationed.

China has been researching space-based kinetic weapons since at least 2006, the report says, including testing for the first time on July 27, 2021 a “fractional orbital launch of an ICBM with a hypersonic glide vehicle.” That test “demonstrated the greatest distance flown (~40,000 kilometers) and longest flight time (~100+ minutes) of any Chinese land attack weapons system to date.”

Pressed for details on the capabilities of China’s fractional orbital bombardment system, the DIA officials refused to be drawn into details. “This is the first time we’ve seen this tested,” Ryder said. “So it’s a little early right now to be able to determine its full set of capabilities, and those that we have determined … can’t be discussed in this forum.”

Beijing also considers space-related electronic warfare (EW) and offensive cyber capabilities as “critical” to modern warfare, the report says. “The PLA routinely incorporates in its exercises jamming and antijamming techniques that probably are intended to deny multiple types of space-based communications, radar systems, and GPS navigation support to military movement and precision-guided munitions employment.” It “probably” also is developing jammers specifically to target SATCOM and SAR — with the latter “very likely” aimed at protecting “terrestrial assets by denying imagery and targeting in any potential conflict involving the United States or its allies.”

The PLA further “has multiple ground-based laser weapons of varying power levels to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellites that include a current limited capability to employ laser systems against satellite sensors. By the mid- to late-2020s, China may field higher power systems that extend the threat to the structures of nonoptical satellites.”

Russia, On A Tighter Budget, Bets On Counterspace Systems

“Russian counterspace doctrine involves employing ground-, air-, cyber-, and space-based systems to target an adversary’s satellites with attacks ranging from temporary jamming or sensor blinding to destruction of enemy spacecraft and supporting infrastructure,” the report finds.

“Russia’s space program is robust but more narrowly focused than China’s. Additionally, Moscow’s budget is more limited than Beijing’s because of competing priorities within Russia’s broader military modernization efforts,” the report notes. Nonetheless, Moscow continues to pursue a range of counterspace systems.

Russia also “employs some of the world’s most capable individual ISR satellites,” including “more than 30 satellites providing electro-optical imagery, a new radar observation platform, missile warning, and electronic and signals intelligence” — half of which belong to the Russian Defense Ministry.

In addition, DIA says, “Russia has fielded a wide range of ground-based EW systems, including mobile systems, to counter GPS, tactical communications, SATCOM, and radars.” This is in accordance with Moscow’s belief that “the information sphere, especially space-enabled information collection and transmission” is “strategically decisive.” Thus, Russia is modernizing “its military’s information attack and defense organizations and capabilities” across the board.

“Russia probably will field lasers that are more capable of damaging satellites in the mid-to-late 2020s.By 2030, Russia may also field higher power systems that extend the threat to the structures of all satellites, not just electro-optical ISR,” the report adds.

DIA also pointed to a host of Russian ASAT testing — including the 2020 test of its Cosmos 2543 satellite that involved a high-speed projectile, and the infamous test last November of a ground-based ASAT missile that created a large debris field in LEO. The military “continues to research and develop sophisticated orbital capabilities that could serve dual-use purposes,” the report adds.

Deep Space Worries

This edition of the DIA report includes a new spotlight on Chinese and Russian Moon and Mars exploration, and potential threats from the increased use of cislunar space for exploration and potential economic exploitation.

“Deep-space operations beyond Earth orbit, sometimes called xGEO, are focused on scientific missions and exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies. Spacecraft in xGEO are much harder to track and characterize, and could threaten U.S. or allied high-value satellites. Adversaries could also place operational or reserve satellites in deep space so they are much harder to monitor for later use in lower orbits,” DIA states.

And the report assesses that if Russia and China are successful in their deep space activities, the report says, “these efforts will likely lead to attempts by Beijing and Moscow to exploit the moon’s natural resources.”

Asked for details by Breaking Defense, Ryder caveated that “what we’ve seen so far has been more civilian in nature. However, China emphasizes in their writings, civil military integration and dual use purpose space capabilities. So, while we do understand that right now it is civil in nature, we continue to monitor for any possibility of military activity.”

Crowded Near Space

The report also widens its examination of threats from increasing congestion and pollution on orbit, the officials said.

“The collision risk is to all civilian, commercial, and government satellites of all nations. This adds to the difficulty of ensuring safe space operations and the overall stability of the space environment,” the report explains.

The report notes that the “primary risk” is “uncataloged lethal nontrackable debris (LNT), which are objects between 5 millimeters and 10 centimeters in size. An estimated 600,000 to 900,000 pieces of uncataloged LNT are in LEO.”

Further, the report finds that the likelihood of “collisions of massive derelict objects” in LEO also is growing “and almost certainly will continue through at least 2030 because of rising numbers of space launches — especially those with multiple payloads — and continuing fragmentation from collisions, battery explosions, and further ASAT testing events.”

 

Arab Observer